September 2026: 48 SRA impersonation alerts
Our September register links 48 SRA scam alerts and explains what the count measures, the patterns it reveals and how firms can test client verification.
The brief
Our review of the SRA’s September scam-alert index found 48 distinct alerts dated 1–30 September 2026, reconciled on 5 October. The earlier 30 September snapshot contained 47 alerts. The full record links every alert, including impersonating emails, websites, calls, documents, social accounts and messaging profiles.
This is a count of warnings published by one regulator, not all scams, affected people or financial losses. The final seven-day period represented here, 22–28 September, contains 16 alerts. Our practical conclusion is to test how a client verifies a specific request through an independently established route. A genuine professional name, registration number or logo cannot by itself establish who sent an instruction or whether it is authorised.
The full record
Archive reconciliation, 19 October 2026: the current September index displays 34 unique warnings across three pages. All are in our saved 48-entry register. We reopened the other 14 original warning URLs; they remain accessible, including Andrew Kidd and Clifford Chance. We retain the 48-entry historical register. An index omission alone does not establish that a warning was withdrawn or that fraud fell. No additional September URL was found in this reconciliation.
Update, 5 October 2026: our earlier snapshot, checked at 19:23 BST on 30 September, contained 47 entries. Reconciliation after month-end found one additional alert dated 30 September: a call claiming to be from Adam Baxter of F A Solicitors. The total is now 48 and the 29–30 September subtotal is seven. We have not established when the entry first became visible. The original publication date of this record is retained.
The Solicitors Regulation Authority’s September index contained 48 distinct scam alerts when we reconciled all three result pages on 5 October 2026. Each entry is linked below. The reporting window is the complete calendar month, 1–30 September, checked on 5 October. Later additions or corrections to the regulator’s archive may still change the total. Open the SRA’s filtered register.
The unit matters. One alert can describe several messages, websites or people. Several alerts can misuse the same genuine firm’s name. Our 48 is therefore a publication count, not 48 proven separate perpetrators, 48 victims or the number of scam attempts. It covers this SRA register, not every impersonation alert issued in the UK or elsewhere.
The count by publication period
- 1–7 September: 6 alerts.
- 8–14 September: 9 alerts.
- 15–21 September: 10 alerts.
- 22–28 September: 16 alerts.
- 29–30 September: 7 alerts.
The five periods sum to 48. The last period contains only two calendar days and should not be compared directly with a full week. No alert in this snapshot is dated 1 September. Dates are the regulator’s publication dates, not necessarily the dates on which the underlying communications were sent.
Correction to our earlier article: a complete reconciliation identifies 16 alerts dated 22–25 September, rather than the 14 in our original report. We had omitted the Georgina Crowhurst email alert and the Ahmed Ali telephone-call alert, both dated 22 September. The earlier article and its method have been corrected. The preceding 15–21 September period contains 10 alerts in this register. These corrected totals do not support the earlier briefing’s claim that warnings doubled.
Impersonation reaches beyond an inbox
The register includes TikTok accounts and WhatsApp messages misusing Clifford Chance’s name, a call and WhatsApp message misusing Ward & Rider’s name, and a profile misusing Tessa Manisty’s identity. A communication channel’s familiarity does not establish the sender’s authority.
The practical takeaway is to give clients an independent route to check the particular request. That route must be established before an unexpected message arrives. A client should not have to rely on the telephone number or link supplied in the questionable communication to decide whether it is genuine.
Routine documents can carry the false authority
Several alerts concern documents that resemble ordinary business administration: invoice-related emails, a tenancy-change letter sent to an energy company, and acquisition and non-disclosure documents. The issue is not confined to a dramatic demand for emergency funds.
Our proposed exercise is to use a fictional change to an existing instruction. Ask the receiving colleague to identify the originator, their authority, the exact change and the required confirmation. Record whether the process depends on an assumption such as recognising a logo or recalling a similar email.
A recovery offer needs the same independent check
The register also includes purported assistance with recovering investment or cryptocurrency funds, including Cyber Law Solution and communications misusing CG Law’s details. These alerts illustrate why a request framed as help should still be checked. They do not establish how often a previously affected person is targeted again.
In the Cross Border Legal alert, the SRA advises verifying suspect correspondence through reliable, established contact with the genuine firm. Our analysis is that the firm’s response should confirm the precise instruction and leave a record of who supplied the answer. Confirmation that a solicitor exists is not confirmation that the solicitor sent this request.
What this first register can become
This is a reproducible starting series for The Formal Record. Future monthly reports can use the same source, date rule and deduplication method. That would support comparisons of publication activity. Claims about fraud prevalence, losses or control effectiveness would still require other evidence.
Our immediate benchmark proposal concerns the reader’s experience: can an unfamiliar client reach the approved verification route and obtain an attributable answer without relying on the suspicious message? Record completion, mistaken assumptions and unresolved handoffs. We have not yet run that benchmark, and these alert counts are not its results.
Complete September alert register
Each link leads to the SRA’s own alert. The names below identify identities or purported entities discussed in the warnings; inclusion is not an allegation of wrongdoing by the genuine professionals or firms whose details were misused.
30 September
- Recovery call claiming to be from Adam Baxter of F A Solicitors
- Leeds Family Law: invoices
- Andrew Kidd: email and website
- Masood Haider: tenancy letter
- SM Solicitors: emails and letterhead
- Ashraf Legal: website
29 September
25 September
24 September
- Andrew Hamilton: inheritance emails
- Hausfeld: compensation emails
- Hamilton Law: correspondence
- Cyber Law Solution: recovery offer
- Al-Taawon Law: recovery document
- Clarke Willmott: tenancy letter
23 September
- Longfords: lease letter
- Hilton Law: website
- Ward & Rider: WhatsApp and call
- Atlee Chung: website
- Mark Shillito: email
22 September
21 September
18 September
16 September
- Raj Law: calls and website
- Kate Andrews: property emails
- Amandeep Kaur Matharu: profile
- Complex Law: telephone calls
- Saunders & Partners: correspondence and calls
- Manak Lawyers: website
15 September
14 September
11 September
- Billy Tee: inheritance emails
- CG Law: crypto-recovery communications
- Samuel Ashford: profile
- Carlos Hernandez Pardo: recovery email
10 September
9 September
8 September
7 September
4 September
3 September
2 September
We selected September 2026 as both the start and end month in the live SRA scam-alert search, reviewed all three result pages and recorded each unique September alert URL once. Our 30 September snapshot contained 47 individual links, all opened and checked at that time. On 5 October 2026 we reconciled all three pages again: 48 unique entries were present, with one additional URL for the F A Solicitors warning dated 30 September. That individual alert was opened and checked. We have not established its first appearance time. Publication dates determine inclusion, not dates embedded in URL folders or incident dates. The five publication-period totals are now 6, 9, 10, 16 and 7, summing to 48. We do not count messages, victims, losses or perpetrators, estimate unreported fraud or claim coverage beyond this register. Version 1.3 added channel and identity counts; version 1.5 removed them because the coding rule behind them was not published and the counts could not be reproduced from the linked alerts. Proposed operational exercises have not been run as benchmarks.
19 October reconciliation: the current three-page index contains 34 unique URLs, all within the saved 48. The remaining 14 original pages were reopened successfully. The 48 is retained as a historical linked register, rather than represented as the current index result count.